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Abstract
A popular method for indexing numerical representations is to compute an
individual estimate of a response time effect, such as the SNARC effect or
the numerical distance effect. Classically, this is done by estimating indi-
vidual linear regression slopes and then either pooling the slopes to obtain
a group-level slope estimate, or using the individual slopes as predictors of
other phenomena. In this paper, I develop a hierarchical Bayesian model for
simultaneously estimating group-level and individual-level slope parameters.
I show examples of using this modeling framework to assess two common
effects in numerical cognition: the SNARC effect and the numerical distance
effect. Finally, I demonstrate that the Bayesian approach can result in
better measurement fidelity than the classical approach, especially with
small samples.
Keywords: hierarchical regression, Bayesian modeling, numerical represen-
tations, SNARC effect, distance effect
The purpose of this paper is to introduce a hierarchical Bayesian model for mea-
suring two types of mental representations that are often assessed in numerical cognition:
the SNARC effect (Dehaene, Dupoux, & Mehler, 1990) and the numerical distance effect
(Moyer & Landauer, 1967). The SNARC effect (Spatial-Numerical Associations of Response
Codes) refers to the finding that response times (RTs) for small numerical stimuli are faster
with the left hand, whereas RTs for large numbers are faster with the right hand. The
numerical distance effect (NDE) refers to the finding that RTs decrease as the numerical
distance between stimulus numbers increases. Both effects are thought to reflect particular
aspects of mental representation of number. As the SNARC effect occurs even when num-
ber magnitude is not salient to a given task (e.g., asking whether a given number is odd
or even), the SNARC effect is often taken as an index of automatic processing of number
magnitude (Wood, Willmes, Nuerk, & Fischer, 2008). Similarly, the NDE is thought to rep-
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resent a noisy, analog representation of number (Dehaene, 1992), and thus is purported to
occur because as numerical distance increases, the amount of representational overlap (and
hence response competition) decreases, resulting in faster RTs (Gevers, Verguts, Reynvoet,
Caessens, & Fias, 2006).
As indices of numerical representation, both the SNARC effect and the NDE have been
used to study individual differences in number representation (Holloway & Ansari, 2009;
Viarouge, Hubbard, & McCandliss, 2014). For example, Viarouge et al. (2014) showed
that participants with stronger SNARC effects tended to exhibit slower mental rotation
processing speed. Similarly, Pinhas, Shaki, and Fischer (2014) found that the SNARC effect
was positively associated with spatial operational momentum. The NDE has been used in a
similar manner. Holloway and Ansari (2009) found that children with a larger NDE tended
to score lower on standardized assessments of mathematical fluency and calculation skill.
Fazio, Bailey, Thompson, and Siegler (2014) showed a similar pattern, namely that the NDE
was negatively correlated with mathematics achivement, but not reading achievement. As
such, it is clear that accurate measurement of the SNARC effect and NDE is a desirable
objective for a wide range of research paradigms within mathematical cognition.
The classical method for measuring the SNARC effect and NDE for individuals is
based on a procedure known as regression coefficient analysis (RCA; Lorch & Myers, 1990).
In this procedure, a dependent measure such as RT is regressed against a predictor for
each individual participant. The estimated slope and intercept for each individual is then
recorded, at which point any number of analyses may be performed. One of the first
examples of this procedure in numerical cognition comes from Fias (1996), who adapted
this method to measure the SNARC effect. Participants’ left-hand and right-hand RTs for
each number stimulus (e.g., 1, 2, 8, 9) were aggregated via the median. Then, the difference
between right- and left-hand RTs (dRT ) was computed for each number. The SNARC effect
was then presented as a negative correlation between number and dRT. That is, for small
numbers (e.g., 1,2), the left hand is faster, so dRT > 0. For large numbers, the right hand
is faster, so dRT < 0. This negative correlation is captured by a linear regression, which is
used to calculate the slope on dRT for each participant. Analyses of the NDE are similar,
but instead of using dRT , one typically regresses RT against a predictor such as numerical
distance (e.g., Holloway & Ansari, 2009) or ratio (e.g., Fazio et al., 2014). As with the
SNARC effect, the NDE typically presents as a negative slope. These slopes can then be
submitted to a variety of analyses, including group-level tests (e.g., does the SNARC/NDE
effect vary by group?) or individual-level correlations (i.e., is the SNARC/NDE effect
correlated with mathematical performance?).
In the following sections, I describe a hierarchical Bayesian approach to measuring
the SNARC effect and the NDE. Certainly, a complete treatment of Bayesian methods
is beyond the scope of this paper, but the interested reader is advised consult the excel-
lent books by Gelman, Carlin, Stern, and Rubin (2013), McElreath (2015), or Kruschke
(2015) for more details. However, I will briefy outline some advantages to using such an
approach to measuring numerical representations. One such advantage is that in a hierar-
chical model, variability from participants and items is modeled simultaneously, resulting
in in both participant-level and group-level parameter estimates. As such, the hierarchi-
cal model allows the researcher to avoid aggregating single estimates across individuals,
which can be problematic (Haider & Frensch, 2002; Heathcote, Brown, & Mewhort, 2000;
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Pratte, Rouder, & Morey, 2010). Another advantage is both philosophical and pragmatic.
Bayesian modeling provides a principled means to combine prior knowledge with new data
via Bayes’ theorem. The result is a quantification of posterior belief in terms of a probabil-
ity distribution that reflects uncertainty after seeing data. From this distribution, one can
estimate a variety of summary statistics, including the posterior mode (i.e., the parameter
estimate with highest density), and Bayesian credible intervals, which give a range of values
containing a particular probability mass.1 One particular type of credible interval used in
a Bayesian context is the highest posterior density interval (HPDI), which is the narrowest
interval containing a given probability mass.
Generally, the models will be constructed as follows. As with the classical method de-
scribed above, the goal is to estimate a slope on dRT (for the SNARC effect) or RT (for the
NDE). However, the proposed models are hierarchical, which means that individual-level
slopes are drawn from a group-level distribution that specifies how the slopes are distributed
in the population. Thus, individual-level and group-level estimates are modeled simunta-
neously, which improves upon the noisy slope estimates usually obtained from classical
regression with small samples (Gelman & Hill, 2013). Further, since the model is Bayesian,
one can specify group-level prior distributions that will moderate extreme individual-level
parameter estimates (i.e., shrinkage), which will result in increased measurement accuracy
for our parameter estimates.
Model 1: estimating the SNARC effect
The model is a hierarchical Bayesian linear regression model, where dRT is predicted
by stimulus number. A graphical representation of the model can be seen in Figure 1.
Formally, we define
dRTij = αi + βi(j) + εij (1)
where i = subject number and j = stimulus number. The residuals εij are assumed to be
normally distributed with mean 0 and precision 1/σ2. Thus, we can express the likelihood
for the data as
dRTij ∼ Normal(µij , 1/σ2) (2)
where µij = αi+βi(j). The prior for each individual-level intercept αi is set to be uniformly
distributed between -200 and 200. The hierarchical structure is instantiated on slope.
First, I set the prior for each individual-level slope βi to be normally distributed with
two hyperparameters: mean b and precision 1/σ2b . In turn, this requires priors on the
hyperparameters – the prior for b is uniformly distributed between -20 and 20. Note that
this range is based on inspection of the slopes obtained in Viarouge et al. (2014). The prior
for group-level slop precision 1/σ2b (as well as group-level residual precision 1/σ2) is set as
a Gamma distribution with both shape and scale equal to 0.01.
1Bayesian credible intervals are not the same thing as frequentist confidence intervals, which are defined
as a range of parameters that would contain a population parameter in some specified percentage of a
large number of repeated samples. While people often misinterpret confidence intervals using probability
statements (Hoekstra, Morey, Rouder, & Wagenmakers, 2014), Bayesian credible intervals can be directly
interpreted as probability statements
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dRTij
µij
βi αi
b σ2b
σ2
number j
subject i
b ∼ Uniform(−20, 20)
1/σ2b ∼ Gamma(0.01, 0.01)
αi ∼ Uniform(−200, 200)
βi ∼ Gaussian(b, σ2b )
µij = αi + βi(j)
1/σ2 ∼ Gamma(0.01, 0.01)
dRTij ∼ Gaussian(µij , σ2)
Figure 1 . Graphical model of the hierarchical Bayesian linear regression model for the
SNARC effect. Following the convention of Lee and Wagenmakers (2014), nodes represent
variables of interest (observed=shaded, latent=unshaded), with dependencies represented
via the graph structure.
Fitting the model
Data. I fit the model to data collected from 35 participants in a number parity task.
The numbers 1, 2, 8, and 9 were presented in the center of a computer screen, after which
participants were asked to quickly indicate via a button press whether the number was even
or odd. The procedure mirrored that of Experiment 1 of Pinhas et al. (2014). Participants
completed 112 trials of the task under two counterbalanced response rules (either even=left
or even=right). This resulted in a collection of 3,920 trials. We removed 259 error trials
and an additional 12 trials for which RT exceeded 3 seconds (a total of 6.9% of trials).
The remaining 3,649 trials were collapsed into 35 × 8 × 2 cells by computing median RT
for each of the conditions defined by crossing the factors of subject, stimulus number, and
response hand. Then, dRT was computed for each combination of subject and number by
subtracting left-hand RT from right-hand RT.
Results. The regression model parameters were estimated using R (R Core Team,
2016) and JAGS (Plummer, 2017). Posterior sampling consisted of 3 MCMC chains, each
containing 100,000 draws. The first 5000 draws of each chain were discarded as “burn-in”
samples, leaving 285,000 samples remaining. These remaining samples were thinned by a
factor of 10, leaving a final sample of 28,500 posterior draws for each parameter. Visual
inspection of trace plots indicated that all chains converged appropriately. Additionally, the
Gelman-Rubin statistic Rˆ = 1.001 for each parameter, indicating that the Markov chains
for each parameter converged to the appropriate stationary distribution (Gelman et al.,
2013; Gelman & Rubin, 1992).
Since the model is hierarchical, I was able to estimate posterior distributions for each
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Figure 2 . Posterior distribution of the group-level slope b for Model 1, indicating a sub-
stantial SNARC effect across the group.
αi and βi (i.e., each participant’s intercept and slope, respectively). Further, I estimated the
posterior distribution of b, which is the group level mean slope. The flexibility of this model
allows one to ask many questions about the SNARC effect, both at the group level and
the individual level. To illustrate, I will investigate whether there was an overall SNARC
effect for the group (c.f., Fias, 1996). This can be answered by looking at the posterior
distribution of the group-level b.
The posterior distribution of the group-level slope b is depicted in Figure 2. As can
be seen in the figure, the mass of the distribution is centered over the posterior mode
b = −11.5. Further, the 95% HPDI for the slope b is [−15.6,−7.3]. Finally, since the
posterior distribution is a probability distribution, we can compute the probability that
b < 0 (that is, the probability that there is a non-zero SNARC effect). This probability is
greater than 0.999. Other Bayesian tools can be applied to this model, such as computing a
Bayes factor comparing a null-SNARC model to our obtained model via the Savage-Dickey
density ratio (Wagenmakers, Lodewyckx, Kuriyal, & Grasman, 2010). Briefly, this method
amounts to computing the density of the value b = 0 in the posterior distribution divided
by the density of b = 0 in the prior (i.e., Uniform(−20, 20)). Doing this resulted in a
Bayes factor of approximately 280,000 to 1 in favor of the alternative hypothesis, indicating
overwhelming support for an overall SNARC effect.
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RTij
µij
βi αi
b σ2b
σ2
number j
subject i
b ∼ Uniform(−100, 100)
1/σ2b ∼ Gamma(0.01, 0.01)
αi ∼ Uniform(0, 2000)
βi ∼ Gaussian(b, σ2b )
µij = αi + βi(j)
1/σ2 ∼ Gamma(0.01, 0.01)
dRTij ∼ Gaussian(µij , σ2)
Figure 3 . Graphical model of the hierarchical Bayesian linear regression model for the nu-
merical distance effect. Following the convention of Lee and Wagenmakers (2014), nodes
represent variables of interest (observed=shaded, latent=unshaded), with dependencies rep-
resented via the graph structure.
Model 2: estimating the numerical distance effect
As with Model 1, this model is also a hierarchical Bayesian linear regression model,
where RT is predicted by numerical distance. For this specific instantiation of the model, I
will index numerical distance via the ratio between compared numbers. For example, Fazio
et al. (2014) used four ratio bins as predictors of RT. A graphical representation of the
model can be seen in Figure 3. Formally, we define
RTij = αi + βi(j) + εij (3)
where i = participant number and j = 1, . . . , 4 equals ratio bin number. The residuals
εij are again assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and precision 1/σ2. The
likelihood for the data is
RTij ∼ Normal(µij , 1/σ2) (4)
where µij = αi+βi(j). The prior for each individual-level intercept αi is set to be uniformly
distributed between 0 and 2000. The prior for each individual-level slope βi to be normally
distributed with two hyperparameters: mean b (with uniform prior between -100 and 100)
and precision 1/σ2b (with a Gamma(.01, .01) prior). Finally, the prior for the group-level
residual precision is Gamma(.01, .01).
Fitting the model
Data. I fit the model to the RT data from Fazio et al. (2014). Fifty-five 5th graders
completed a symbolic number comparison task, in which they were asked to choose which
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Figure 4 . Posterior distribution of the group-level slope b for Model 2, indicating a sub-
stantial numerical distance effect across the group.
of two Arabic numerals was larger. Each child completed 40 trials using stimulus numbers
ranging from 5 to 21. Of the 40 trials, 10 came from each of 4 ratio bins: 1.15 - 1.28,
1.28 - 1.43, 1.48 - 1.65, and 2.46 - 2.71. The ratio for each stimulus pair was defined as
the quotient obtained when dividing the larger number by the smaller number. In all,
participants completed 2,200 trials. I removed 95 error trials and 6 additional trials for
which RT exceeded 5 seconds (a total of 4.6% of trials). The remaining 2,099 trials were
collapsed into 55 × 4 cells by computing median RT for each of the conditions defined by
crossing the factors of subject and ratio bin.
Results. The regression model was fit using the same procedure as in Model 1. As
before, visual inspection of trace plots indicated that all chains converged appropriately,
with Rˆ = 0.001 for all parameters.
The posterior distribution of the group-level slope b is depicted in Figure 4. As
can be seen in the figure, the mass of the distribution is centered over the posterior mode
b = −65.9, with 95% HPDI for the slope b equal to [−83.4,−50.7]. In addition to estimating
the group-level slope, we can test the existence of the numerical distance effect via a Bayes
factor, which as before I computed using the Savage-Dickey density ratio. This Bayes
factor was approximately 1.7 million to 1 in favor of the alternative hypothesis, indicating
overwhelming support for an overall numerical distance effect.
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Comparing the model to the classical approach
In this section, I will demonstrate that the hierarchical Bayesian model developed
in this paper can provide better measurement fidelity for the group-level regression slopes
that are desired when assessing group-level SNARC effects or NDEs, particularly for small
samples. As mentioned earlier, the reason for this increased accuracy is because of a property
that is unique to Bayesian inference – namely the property of shrinkage. When one specifies
a group-level prior distribution for the slope (e.g., the Uniform(−20, 20) distribution that I
used in Model 1), this prior is then combined with the data likelihood via Bayes theorem by
multiplication. In our case, extreme individual slope estimates (those beyond -20 and 20)
vanish by virtue of being multiplied by the prior probability of obtaining those estimates
(i.e., probability = 0). The resulting posterior distribution is then shrunk away from these
parameter estimates.
To demonstrate this, I conducted a simulation. I randomly generated dRT values for
a small samples of n = 15 simulated participants as follows. First, I generated 15 random
slopes bi, where bi ∼ Gaussian(−10, 1). That is, I assumed that individual slopes are drawn
from a normal distribution centered at -10, with standard deviation 1. Similarly, I randomly
generated 15 random intercepts ai, where ai ∼ Uniform(−200, 200). Then, I generated
dRTij = ai + bi(j) + εij
where i = 1, . . . , 15, j = 1, 2, 8, 9, and εij ∼ Gaussian(0, 100). Then, I computed a classical
linear regression for each participant i = 1, . . . , 15, recording each estimated slope bˆi. Fi-
nally, I fit the hierarchical Bayesian model (Model 1) to the overall set of data to compute
the posterior distribution of b.
The results can be seen in Figure 5. Notice that while both the frequentist 95%
confidence interval and the Bayesian 95% highest posterior density interval contain the
population mean b = −10, the Bayesian estimate is much less variable. This is because
compared to the classical linear regression method (e.g., Lorch & Myers, 1990), the extreme
parameter estimates are shrunk toward the posterior mean. The same story is repeated
with hypothesis testing, as well. Indeed, performing a t-test on the individual regression
slopes (as in Fias, 1996) results in a non-significant SNARC effect, t(14) = −1.82, p = 0.09,
which results in a Type II error. However, a Bayesian hypothesis test (the Savage-Dickey
method) yields a Bayes factor that favors the SNARC effect by a factor of 75 to 1.
Discussion
The purpose of this paper was to introduce a hierarchical Bayesian linear regres-
sion framework for measuring group-level and individual-level numerical representations.
The models were then applied to two common markers of numerical representations: the
SNARC effect, which indexes spatial-numerical associations, and the numerical distance
effect (NDE), which indexes representations of numerical magnitude. The models devel-
oped here represent a straightforward Bayesian extension of the classical linear regression
approach to measuring these effects that was introduced by Lorch and Myers (1990) and
first applied to the SNARC effect by Fias (1996).
Both models were built from a hierarchical Bayesian framework, which is advanta-
geous for several reasons. First, the models assume that the regression slopes (the primary
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Figure 5 . Slope estimates from a simulated data set of n = 15 participants. The solid
line represents the posterior density of b, the group-level slope estimate for the SNARC
effect. The histogram represents the slope estimates obtained from separate classical linear
regressions for each individual.
object of interest in these analyses) are drawn from a group-level distribution. This hierar-
chical definition allows both group-level and individual-level slope estimates to be modeled
simultaneously from the data. As such, we can answer questions at either the group-level
(i.e., is there a SNARC effect?) or participant-level (i.e., are the slopes associated with ohter
measures, such as math achievement?). For example, one might use this framework as a
stepping stone to a more complex model, where the group-level slopes b are hypothesized
to differ by some independent variable. A concrete instance of this comes from studies in
which the authors found group differences in the SNARC effect (e.g., Cipora et al., 2015;
Fischer, Mills, & Shaki, 2010). One could perform similar studies by building an additional
linear model on these group-level parameters, with priors appropriate to such effects (e.g.,
a Cauchy prior, as in Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009). Importantly, since
the inference would be done in a Bayesian framework, it is possible to measure evidence for
null effects too (Wagenmakers, 2007), so the model could be used to test for invariances as
well as differences.
Another advantage to using a hierarchical Bayesian model for numerical represen-
tations is that such models tend to have better measurement fidelity. Indeed, one of the
advantages of the Bayesian framework in general is the notion of shrinkage, where extreme
parameter estimates are “shrunk” toward the mean by virtue of the prior (Gelman et al.,
2013). This property is particularly salient for small samples, where classical frequentist
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methods tend to perform poorly. I demonstrated exactly this phenomenon in the simulation
above: because of some extreme individual-level slope estimates, the frequentist confidence
interval was quite wide, and as a result, we could not detect the SNARC effect. However,
the Bayesian highest posterior density interval provided a much more accurate estimate of
the true population slope. Critically, in this simulation, only the Bayesian method produced
the correct inference.
A final advantage to this modeling framework that I will mention is that all assump-
tions of the model are made explicit. This may be a new approach to some, especially
those who are accustomed to classical inferential software packages for which the statisti-
cal assumptions are kept “under the hood.” However, I think the approach presented in
this paper can be very useful to a wide variety of problems in cognitive psychology, as the
researcher can take the models presented here and modify them for any desired context.
Indeed, the prior knowledge of a given field can be easily and coherently integrated into the
model without too much work.
In summary, the models developed in this paper will provide a flexible tool that
can be used to estimate group-level and individual-level numerical representations quickly
and coherently. Further, the methods developed are not specific to numerical cognition,
so application to a wide variety of problems should not be too difficult. Regardless of
the application, the hierarchical Bayesian linear regression framework presented here pro-
vides a powerful, coherent, and accurate measurement model for applied work in cognitive
psychology.
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